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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MITCHELL WILLIAM JENKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44486
Ada County Case No.
CR-2015-4470

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Jenkins failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either
by imposing a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea
to possession of methamphetamine, or by relinquishing jurisdiction?

Jenkins Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Jenkins pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.23-24, 36, 51-55.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the
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district court relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.72-74.) Jenkins filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp.75-77.)
Jenkins asserts his sentence is excessive in light of the nature of the offense, his
education and employment goals, and his moderate risk to reoffend. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.4-6.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for possession of methamphetamine is seven
years. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with two years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.5155.)

Furthermore, Jenkins’ sentence is appropriate in light of his ongoing criminal

offending, history of absconding supervision and disregard for the terms of community
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supervision, claim that he does not require rehabilitative treatment, continued criminal
behavior while this case was pending, and failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions.

As a juvenile, Jenkins incurred

several charges for minor in possession and was also adjudicated for carrying a
concealed weapon; in that case he absconded and remained at large until the case was
eventually closed, years later. (PSI, pp.5-6. 1) In October 2000, Jenkins was twice
convicted of minor in possession of alcohol. (PSI, p.6.) In November 2000, he was
convicted of burglary in Oregon and was placed on probation. (PSI, p.6.) According to
Jenkins’ Oregon probation officer, Jenkins absconded in 2001, “was picked up in 2002
and absconded again in May 2002.” (PSI, p.9.) Jenkins was “picked up again in
February 2012 and released from jail in April 2012. Five (5) days later he absconded
again,” and, at the time of sentencing for the instant offense, there was still an active
warrant in Oregon for the probation violation. (PSI, p.9.) Jenkins was convicted of
burglary in Idaho in November 2002 and was placed on probation after completing the
retained jurisdiction program. (PSI, pp.6-7.) While he was on probation for the Idaho
burglary, he violated his probation twice and committed the new crimes of invalid
driver’s license, domestic battery (amended from rape), and rape.

(PSI, pp.6-7.)

Jenkins was sentenced to prison for the rape, and while in prison, he incurred five
DOR’s, refused to participate in sex offender treatment, and ultimately topped out his
sentence in 2009.

(PSI, pp.7, 9-10, 65.)

Between 2010 and 2014, Jenkins was

convicted of petit theft, two counts of invalid driver’s license (one of which was amended
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Jenkins
44528 psi.pdf.”
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from DWP), permitting animals to go without care, and providing false information.
(PSI, pp.7-8.)
In the instant offense, Jenkins drove with an invalid driver’s license and no proof
of insurance and, upon being stopped for a traffic violation, he lied to officers with
respect to his identity “because he did not want to get a ticket.” (PSI, pp.76-77.) In
Jenkins’ vehicle, officers found a baggie containing methamphetamine, three glass
methamphetamine pipes, a straw, and 11 small plastic baggies. (PSI, p.85.) Jenkins
also had $777.00 in cash in his front pocket, some of which was counterfeit. (PSI,
p.87.) While the instant case was pending, Jenkins committed the new crimes of petit
theft in August 2015 and disorderly conduct in September 2015. (PSI, p.9.) He also
continued to abuse illegal substances while on pretrial release, admitting, in August
2015, to smoking marijuana and, approximately six weeks later, he again violated the
conditions of his release by having a “dirty” UA. (R., pp.35-36, 40.) In October 2015,
Jenkins told the presentence investigator that he had used both marijuana and
methamphetamine in September 2015, just before his pretrial release was revoked.
(PSI, p.14; R., p.40.)
During his substance abuse evaluation, Jenkins advised that he first used illegal
substances at age 13, and reported using alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, inhalants, opioids,
hallucinogens, sedatives, hypnotics, anxiolytics, amphetamines, and spice. (PSI, p.59.)
He admitted that he had last used marijuana two days before his evaluation and that he
“consumes an 1/8 of marijuana every two days.” (PSI, p.57.) Jenkins also reported that
he “has not stopped using substances and is 0% ready to quit,” and told the evaluator,
“‘I don't have a problem with marijuana, I will continue to use marijuana. I will stop
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smoking for court and legal, once I'm off supervision I will go back to smoking.’” (PSI,
p.57.) Despite his ongoing substance abuse and the resulting criminal charges, Jenkins
stated that he “did not think substance abuse treatment was needed.” (PSI, p.59.)
The substance abuse evaluator reported:
Over the past 12 months, [Jenkins] endorsed engaging in the following
behaviors related to Conduct Disorder two or more times: bullying or
threatening other people; starting fights with other people; being physically
cruel to other people; taking money or things from a house, building, or
car; lying or conning to get desired things or to avoid having to do
something; taking things from a store or writing bad checks to buy
things....
(PSI, p.60.) Jenkins also acknowledged that, “during a disagreement in the past 12
months,” he engaged in “insulting, swearing, or cursing at someone; kicking, biting, or
hitting someone; [and] beating up someone.” (PSI, p.60.) Jenkins further “reported last
swearing, cursing, threatening someone, throwing something, or pushing or hitting
someone in any way during an argument within the past two days and that this behavior
occurred on 90 out of the past 90 days. … He stated he last engaged in any behavior
that might result in getting into trouble or be against the law (besides using alcohol or
other drugs) within the past two days.” (PSI, p.60 (parenthetical notation original).)
The

presentence

investigator

aptly

concluded,

“Jenkins

seems

rather

lackadaisical about living a prosocial life. After he bonded out of jail he continued to
participate in criminal activity,” and, “I question whether Mr. Jenkins is a viable
candidate for probation at this time. I feel that participating in a period of Retained
Jurisdiction could provide him an opportunity to show the Court he is serious about
making serious changes in his life while he participates in treatment. (PSI, p.19.) At
sentencing, the state likewise recommended the retained jurisdiction program; however,
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it noted that Jenkins would need to “do, you know, a very, very good Rider … given his
criminal history and his stated desire to continue using drugs upon his release, the State
is really going to need to be impressed by a major shift in his attitude on the Rider to be
able to consider recommending probation in this case.” (10/23/15 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-14.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed an
appropriate sentence. Jenkins’ sentence is reasonable in light of his ongoing criminal
offending, history of abysmal performance on community supervision, belief that he
does not require rehabilitative treatment, continued substance abuse and criminal
behavior while this case was pending, and failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions. Given any reasonable view of the
facts, Jenkins has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.
Jenkins next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction in light of his claim that the court “all-but required” him to participate in the
NICI sex offender treatment program that was recommended by IDOC – despite the fact
that Jenkins agreed to participate in that very program – and because, he claims, the
court “ultimately relinquished jurisdiction because [he] did not actively participate in
treatment.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4).
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203,
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A

court’s

decision

to

relinquish

jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
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information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583,
584 (Ct. App. 1984).
At the beginning of his period of retained jurisdiction, Jenkins was placed in the
CAPP program.

(PSI, p.139.)

Before he was sent to the CAPP facility, Jenkins

received an incident report for arguing with multiple staff members regarding a sanction
and “leering at staff aggressively.” (PSI, p.149.) While at the CAPP facility, Jenkins
incurred a total of three incident reports, for failing to show up for orientation, talking
during count, and being in an unauthorized area. (PSI, pp.143, 148.) Approximately six
weeks into his program, CAPP staff reported:
Jenkins … has been close[d] minded to curriculum and feedback.
He has expressed during Partners In Parenting he would not let his 14
year old daughter wear a mini skirt, [“]I would make her change![”] When
asked why he would react so harshly to the situation he said, [“]Well these
girls walk around these days just asking for it[”,] turned towards peers and
said, [“]you know what I mean[”] and laughed. Instructor tried to redirect
thinking and he became irritated, using victim stance [“]you[’re] just picking
on me![”] [He] closed off by folding arms across chest, arguing, and
looking down with no eye contact. This behavior has continued for most
of the week. Mr. Jenkins informed instructor he feels picked on and [“]I
just won[’]t talk in class![”] He refuses to participate in class discussions
and works on homework assignments during class; he was asked to stop,
he slammed his note book shut, sat back in seat, and crossed arms
across chest.
(PSI, pp.146-47.) Several weeks later, toward the end of Jenkins’ CAPP programming,
CAPP staff noted:
Mr. Jenkins continues to be close[d] minded and defensive with feedback.
He constantly asks to lead class discussions and when denied will
become aggressive, repeatedly opening and slamming binder shut and
tossing his pencil on table. He is having a hard time following simple
classroom rules and has be[en] repeatedly asked to keep his binder
closed during presentations; he becomes angry by slamming binder
closed and throwing his body back in his chair crossing arms across
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chest. He was told this is the last verbal warning next disobedience to
orders will result in written warning.
(PSI, p.145.) CAPP staff ultimately concluded:
Although [Jenkins] has showed progress with communication skills, he
continues to struggle with faulty criminal thinking, not taking full
responsibility for his actions by making light of the situation or joking,
being close[d] minded to feedback and some curriculum, becoming angry,
and constantly wanting to control classroom activities and conversations.
PSI, p.143.)

The district court concluded that Jenkins’ performance in the CAPP

program was “abysmal,” and continued the rider review hearing “to give the defendant
and his attorney an opportunity to subpoena someone from the Department of
Correction for the hearing to explain IDOC's recommendation for probation.” (R., p.66.)
A Deputy Chief at IDOC’s Prisons Division subsequently reviewed Jenkins’ case and
determined that an error had occurred at RDU and that Jenkins should have been
placed in the sex offender treatment rider, and requested that the court allow Jenkins to
participate in the sex offender rider program as he had never before participated in sex
offender treatment. (R., p.65.) Jenkins then informed the district court that “he would
gladly participate in the Sex Offender Treatment Program” as recommended. (R., p.64.)
The district court granted the request and vacated the rider review hearing to allow
Jenkins to participate in the sex offender treatment program at NICI before his period of
retained jurisdiction expired. (R., p.67; PSI, pp.152-53.)
Jenkins performed extremely poorly at NICI. He failed to complete his assigned
programming and incurred at least 12 informal disciplinary sanctions and three DOR’s.
(PSI, pp.153-55, 160-66.)

NICI advised, “Many times staff reported that it felt like

[Jenkins] was trying to intimidate them [b]y raising his voice and stepping closer to
them. He used profanity and name calling when a staff member would not back down.
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He frequently shared his opinion that this program was stupid, inconsistent, a joke, and
he should not be at NICI since he had served out his time on his sex offense.” (PSI,
pp.155-56.)

Program staff ultimately concluded, “This antagonistic attitude toward

authority that Mr. Jenkins has displayed while at NICI is not predictive of doing well on
probation. At this time, he could not be considered a good candidate for probation.”
(PSI, p.156.) NICI recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction, stating:
Mr. Jenkins could not be considered a viable candidate for probation at
this time. He has been antagonistic toward following rules and wanted to
argue every disciplinary action he received. He spent most of his energy
in his CBI-SO group trying to convince the facilitator and his peers that he
did not need this group since he had gone 10 years crime free. He was
not truthful in that he left out a great deal of information, such as the
amount of time in 10 years that he was incarcerated and that he had never
completed treatment. Rather than address his sex offending risks, he
tried to address his substance abuse issues or petty problems in the unit.
He has an overwhelming need to be right and to be perceived as smarter
than others. This interferes with his ability to listen to feedback and
accepting any view other than his own. He would be very difficult to
supervise on probation if this attitude continues.
(PSI, p.158.)
At the jurisdictional review hearing, the state argued:
It’s clear Mr. Jenkins is not a candidate for probation at this time, that he
did quite poorly on this period of retained jurisdiction, possibly even worse
than he did on the first period of retained jurisdiction.
And so I don’t see any improvement. I don’t see any reason to
think that Mr. Jenkins would do well on probation. And so we would ask
you to relinquish jurisdiction.
(8/19/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-10.) The district court agreed, stating, “Your performance
does not merit being placed on probation.
relinquish jurisdiction.”

And, therefore, I am going to

(8/19/16 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-7.)

Jenkins is not a viable

candidate for community supervision, particularly in light of his abysmal
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performance in the retained jurisdiction program, continued criminal thinking and
disregard for institutional rules, failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative progress
and lack of amenability to rehabilitative programming, and the risk he poses to
the community. Jenkins has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Jenkins’ conviction and
sentence and the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.

DATED this 13th day of April, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming_____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of April, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming_____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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